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Consent is one of the most important tools of Bioethics – or Applied Ethics in general. It is tightly connected with notions and ideas such as rights, autonomy and respect. It is not surprising how much 
philosophers have delved into the matter trying to identify its conditions, its 
limits and its applicability. 
In a sort of Wittgensteinian way, if philosophy is about making terms used 
in other fields clearer, then, it is quite arguable that this has not happened in 
the case of consent. The relevant terminology remains somewhat obscure 
and vague – especially if we deviate from the “popular” terms of “informed 
consent,” or even “implied-,” “hypothetical-,” and “proxy-” consent. Exactly 
this task is undertaken in this paper. The tools used are logical analysis and 
synthesis, as well as Aristotle’s square of opposition. Our approach here, 
also shows why and how a different and more targeted educational model 
is needed.
The Analytic Model of Consent and the 
Square of Opposition
Abstract
Modeling consent is a process prior to any discussion about it, be it theoretical or 
practical. Here, after examining consent, I shall attempt to present a “logical generator” 
that produces all different cases of consent (and/or of non-consent), so that afterwards we 
may articulate a two-dimensional model which will enable us to coherently demonstrate 
all possible types of consent. The resulting model will be combined with Aristotle’s square 
of opposition, offering us even greater insight. I shall claim that full(y) informed consent 
is an archetype, not realized in most cases; it is just one case out of hundreds more. I shall 
conclude with an educational model for consent, the principle of specificity, arguing that 
if we wish to both understand consent and become more adept in exercising it, we need a 
targeted educational system – not just “better education” in general.   
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I. Archetypical consent…
… or consent in theory. In this section, I shall attempt to present the parameters 
of the ideal type of “full(y) informed consent” (fully informed full consent), 
its logical analysis, that is, the intersection of basic epistemology and ethics, 
and also to (re)define the notion of consent within this epistemological 
context. 
Why would anyone mix ethics and epistemology in the first place? Well, 
epistemology is all about knowledge. In specific, “epistemology” (in Greek: 
επιστημολογία) is a compound, formed from the words epistēmē and logos. The 
first term, επιστήμη, refers to what is falsely known to the west as “science” – 
when it is its exact opposite; the second term, λόγος, is one of the most versatile 
words in Greek language, meaning anything from speech and reason to logic.1 
Whereas epistēmē is related to science (even if this relationship is more of an 
antithesis), a more relevant term would be gnoseology, γνωσεολογία, since in 
this compound, gnosis (γνῶσις) may accurately be translated as knowledge. 
However, in the English language, gnosis has theological connotations; its 
historical usage is related to Gnosticism.
So, how is epistemology meant here? Whereas epistemology, as 
gnoseology, is closely related to the very foundations of ethics – i.e.: where 
do we fish our ethical rules from? or is it merely our psychological condition 
that dictates our ethical canons? (cf. psychologism), I am addressing its 
original meaning. Epistemology is the study of epistēmē and, as such, it may 
primarily be reduced to mathematics; mathēmata philosophias (μαθήματα 
φιλοσοφίας – philosophy lessons). As such, epistemology will help us create 
a logical analysis of consent.
Whereas the very idea of consent has been a very popular subject in 
ethical philosophy, some of its major logical counterparts, i.e. uninformed 
consent and unintentional consent, have not been so thoroughly studied. 
Here, I shall attempt to approach both positive and negative versions of 
consent in a unified way – the task is all too easy, since logic does not 
allow us to make any affirmative deductive inferences based on negative 
premises; in such mixed circumstances, it only accepts reductio ad absurdum, 
that is, examining its affirmative conjugate by simply asking the question: 
“unintentional consent… what if it were intentional?” Thus, we shall have to 
examine consent first, in order to proceed to its other versions.
The very first step we would be obliged to follow is to define consent. 
Literature is somewhat problematic in that respect. For instance, whereas 
1  Konstantinos G. Papageorgiou, and Dimitris Lekkas, “Επιστήμη Και (vs) Scientia,” in Φιλοσοφία, 
Φυσικές Επιστήμες, Βιοηθική, ed. K. Kalahanis, accessed May 25, 2019, http://deeaef.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Papageorgiou-Lekkas-full-text.pdf.
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Unesco’s “Informed Consent” guide does inform us about what being informed 
implies, it says nothing about consent itself – apart from a vague statement 
that “No consent will be valid which does not depend on willingness.”2 
Elsewhere, we read that: “Psychologically, consent can designate ‘a state of 
mind of acquiescence,’ and ‘an act of will – a subjective mental state […].’”3 
Alternatively, if we looked up the term in a dictionary, we would see that 
consent is defined as “compliance in or approval of what is done or proposed 
by another: acquiescence.”4 What is proposed here is that “consent is the 
deliberate act of acceptance of an external situation or an action directed 
towards the individual.”5 Informed consent – and any other kind thereof – is 
defined accordingly, based on the aforementioned basic affirmative definition. 
One problem of this definition seems to be that it takes for granted that one 
can easily discriminate between self-regarding and other-regarding acts – a 
problem Jovan Babić has discussed in more detail.6 Again, the definition does 
not presuppose that it is 100% or easily applicable; it is we who should decide 
its scope.
Another problem could be its requirement for deliberance. But what 
about the absolutely negative lexical terms implying lack of deliberance? 
What about unintentional consent, uninformed consent, not unintentional 
consent, tacit consent, hypothetical consent and so on and so forth? Those 
can only be defined as the absence of their affirmative counterparts, e.g. 
“unintentional consent” being the “absence of intention or of intentionality” 
in the consent; the affirmative opposite, as in “intentional consent,” is the 
only thing that has already been effectively well-defined. Hypothetical 
consent – or other similar kinds thereof – is not consent per se; this is why 
they have different names. However, they are closely connected with the idea 
of consent (as defined here), and it is up to us to decide when and how they 
are acceptable. By all means, as we shall discuss again and again, consent – 
or, to make matters worse, full(y) informed consent – is not, and cannot be, 
2  Amnon Carmi, Informed Consent, ed. Amnon Carmi (Haifa: Israel National Commission for 
Unesco, 2003), 6; cf. Oviedo, 1997.
3  Italics not in the original; Nir Eyal, “Informed Consent,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zelta, 2011. Cf. Eyals’s citations: Peter Westen,  The Logic 
of Consent: The Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defense to Criminal Conduct 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 5; Heidi M. Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent,” Legal Theory 2 
(1996): 121.
4 “Consent,” Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consent.
5  Konstantinos G. Papageorgiou, Ηθική και Επιστημολογία: Το Αναλυτικό Μοντέλο Συναίνεσης 
στην Εφαρμοσμένη Φιλοσοφία: Τρόφιμα, Εκπαίδευση, Πολιτισμός, Βιοπληροφορική (Αθήνα: 
Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών, 2017).
6  Jovan Babić, “Self-Regarding / Other-Regarding Acts: Some Remarks,” Prolegomena 5, no. 2 
(2006): 193-207.
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the sole criterion towards qualifying an external act as permissible: it is just 
one, quite improbable, case among hundreds.
Lexically negative (in Greek: apophatic) types of consent, therefore, can 
only be defined via their affirmative counterpart. This logical inversion qualifies 
as a kind of reductio ad absurdum, where we are sort of asking the question 
“Unintentional consent? Hmmm, let us see; what if it were intentional?” as 
the only means of studying it. Is that the only approach one can take?
There are additional tools one may utilize as an aid in the study of consent. 
Logical analysis creates a network – an ecosystem – in which inter-relations 
between terms clarify the meanings of them all, both well-defined and un- or 
ill-defined ones. This is a pure (or hardcore / mainstream) epistemological 
approach, treating terms as void symbols trying to explore all and every 
possible combination. Multi-poles are thus created. Only afterwards, i.e. 
after such multi-poles have been constructed, should we begin the process 
of interpretation, i.e. the process of affording void abstract terminology and 
symbols (words or phrases in our case) with meanings. Let us examine one 
such case by creating the minimum quadri-pole of “informed consent.” 
1. Informed consent.
2. Not informed consent.
3. Informed non-consent.
4. Not informed non-consent.
This might seem trivial; however, its consequences are far-reaching. 
For one, it is quite a realization itself to understand that in every case of 
contrariety, or simple opposition, or contrast, or juxtaposition (in Greek: 
antithesis, antiparathesis) as opposed to cases of contradiction (in Greek: 
antiphasis), the minimum cases are not two, but at least four – the minimum 
logical quadric-pole. Another implication is that, if “informed consent” is 
shorthand for informed, voluntary, and decisionally-capacitated consent, 
then, as soon as we try out some variations of “informed” and “consent,” 
it will become immediately apparent how powerful a tool we have acquired:
5. Voluntary consent.
6. Not voluntary consent.
7. Voluntary non-consent.
8. Not voluntary non-consent.
Many more poles are produced when we use extra predicates in more 
specific contexts:
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9.  Informed voluntary consent.
10.  Not informed voluntary consent.
11.  Informed not voluntary consent.
12.  Informed voluntary non-consent.
13.  Not informed not voluntary consent.
14.  Not informed voluntary non-consent.
15.  Informed not voluntary non-consent.
The same applies to negative forms of consent…
16.  Uninformed consent.
17.  Not uninformed consent.
18.  Uninformed non-consent.
19.  Not uninformed non-consent.
But also…
20.  Disinformed consent.
21.  Not disinformed consent.
22.  Disinformed non-consent.
23.  Not disinformed non-consent (instead of disinformed one may as 
well try misinformed, not necessarily informed etc.).
24.  Refusal of informed consent.
25.  Not refusal of informed consent.
26.  Informed refusal of consent.
27.  Informed not refusal of consent.
28.  Not informed refusal of consent.
29.  Refusal of informed non-consent.
Or…
30.  Informed participation.
31.  Not informed participation.
32.  Informed non-participation.
33.  Not informed non-participation.
... and so on and so forth, creating lists, or cladistic trees, or even 
mental maps of hundreds of cases that will be more or less inter-connected. 
Afterwards, we may want to attribute meaning to all those terms – or at least 
to the ones that matter the most, or to the ones that actually make sense 
to us (some may not seem interpretable – at least for our current state of 
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mind or knowledge). I have already pointed out in what way it is important 
for philosophers to be able to discriminate among these subtle colourings 
of consent, be it for legal or other use, or simply because it is what we do 
in our line of work.7 One could indeed be baffled by what No. 29 means 
(refusal of informed non-consent) in the real world. However, one might just 
need to know what No. 3 means (informed non-consent): it might refer to 
cases where someone is informed, but does not consent. No. 29 is the refusal 
of that. Who refuses it? Is it the (not) consenting agent or the other side? 
It depends on the interpretation. There is no one-to-one correspondence. 
As much as one is able to construct all possible combinations (and they 
would count in the thousands), interpreting each term is a whole different 
process, with one-to-many correspondences, depending, for instance, on the 
selected point of reference, experiences, expectations etc. What is certain, 
as we have seen in this example by connecting cases 3 and 29, is that, as we 
explore this eco-system of consent, terms will keep becoming more and more 
transparent. And, in addition to all this, let us in no way walk past clear or 
debatable or debated legal sides of interpretation, issues, views, different for 
different societies, periods, attorneys and judges and courts of law, and their 
sometimes compulsory nature...
One thing has become pretty clear until now: the so-called “full(y) 
informed consent” is just one case in thousands. It may be more realistic 
– or fruitful – to view it as an archetype: as a perfect and ideal condition, 
which we usually hope to achieve through various processes. The reason I 
used the adverb “usually” is because there are cases where such an ideal type 
of consent is not… all that ideal. For example, both the reasonable person 
standard and the individual standard pose limits as to the quality and the 
quantity of knowledge that a non-expert person needs in order to make a sound 
choice; too much information here is considered “too much of a good thing;” 
sometimes, full(y) informed consent, simply put, does not work.8 Moreover, it 
seems that the autonomy-surplus afforded to us by full(y) informed consent 
may turn against us in the ever-going battle between autonomy and utility. 
Consider, for example, embarrassing mistakes, or social pressure to make 
certain choices:9 less autonomy, less worries!
However, our worry here is to make clear what an archetypical full(y) 
informed consent consists of. Such an endeavour is not directly affected by 
7  Konstantinos G. Papageorgiou, “The Subtle Colourings of (Informed) Consent in Performance 
Enhancement: Implications for Expertise,” Philosophy Study 7, no. 4 (2017): 197-203.
8  Tom L. Beauchamp, and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008).
9  Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988).
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the existence of exceptions – or just other cases. It would be irrational if 
we expected such a condition to always apply, as long as there are so many 
cases where it is obviously out of the question (unconscious patients, babies, 
Alzheimer’s patients etc.). The archetype is merely a reference point that may 
never be realized – and for good reason. But if it were to become a reality, 
or if we simply wanted to grasp its theoretical meaning, we should turn our 
gaze towards the most important and relevant process, which is none other 
than education. Therefore, the educational parameter of consent is going 
to attract our locus of focus, but only later, after we further examine the 
ramifications of our approach. 
II. The Constituents of consent / Modeling consent
As our examination of consent progresses, it would seem invaluable to present 
a universal model of consent. Such a model would account for all types of 
consent, as well as expose their inter-relations. It would be based on what we 
shall identify as the two basic components of consent, i.e. intentionality and 
directionality. Autonomy, that would strike as the third candidate, is more 
of a prerequisite rather than a dimension of consent. Afterwards, a further 
logical analysis of the model will allow us to relate it with Aristotle’s iconic 
square of opposition from his Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας (De interpretatione).
So, consent is defined as the deliberate act of acceptance of an 
external situation or an action directed towards the individual. What 
stands out in this definition is the requisite of deliberance. Indeed, that 
is a very important notion and a core constituent of major traditions, 
such as Theosophy.10 Under such interpretations, we are deterministic 
machines not capable of deliberate acts, and only after years of extensive 
efforts do we acquire, if only gradually, the capacity to act deliberately 
(vs. to merely react). Such interpretations show us that notions such 
as “full(y) informed” consent are true archetypes, i.e. ideal situations 
that may never materialize (as is the case with an-archetypical triangle: 
no real triangle has – or will ever have – e.g. sides with zero thickness, 
unlike the ideal triangle).
It is quite easy to identify why intentionality is a major component of 
consent. Intentionality is a capacity for conscious actions, and consent 
should – by default – be conscious, if it is to be named “consent” in 
the first place. On the other hand, such an intention is coloured by 
its direction.11 For example, it is said (and for this example it is not 
10  P. D. Ouspensky, The Fourth Way (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957).
11 Cf. consciousness as object-directedness, Kristjan Laasik, “Consciousness and Intentionality: 
The Face of the Phenomena,” Prolegomena 15, no. 1 (2016): 5-19.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 22:16:29 |
[ 86 ]
KONSTANTINOS PAPAGEORGIOU THE ANALYTIC MODEL OF CONSENT AND THE SQUARE OF OPPOSITION
imperative to know if it is true) that humans develop sexual drive (libido) 
even as infants. However, until one develops a representation for what 
one would like to do with one’s sexual drive, it remains just a vague 
feeling; only later will it have any real – or, for that matter, practical 
– significance, when the person will be able to channel this primordial 
energy towards specific acts, that one has meanwhile “learned” to be 
an effective way to express one’s sexuality. The creation, therefore, of 
specific representations is conditional for “using” that sort of capacity. 
The more accurate the representation, the more directed would the 
utilization of the said capacity be, or of the capacity of consent. In 
saying that, then, we do recognize an important informational (and thus 
educational?) parameter in direction: the more information I gather, 
be it sensory, or verbal, the more I increase my capacity to assess the 
situation at hand and to direct my intentional will, e.g. in order to 
“choose wisely.”
To this end, before one even attempts to sketch what such an 
educational system would look like, one should develop a viable system: 
one that represents the vast amount of possible cases that revolve 
around consent. At least in part, this multi-faceted nature of consent 
is acknowledged by several contemporary writers, who e.g. discriminate 
between “thin informed consent” and “fuller informed consent,” but 
also between “hypothetical consent” and “implied consent,” and so 
on.12 Such a model is presented in figure 1.
If intentionality and directionality are treated as the two axes of an 
orthogonal coordinate system, then all the cases may nicely fit in the 
resulting figure. Here, we have attempted i. to express consent in terms 
of these two dimensions, and ii. to show how we think that a selection of 
eight basic variations of consent should be represented. Two additional 
cases have been added in the form of vectors (“misinformed consent” 
and “participation”), as an example of how still other cases would fit into 
this model. Where the two axes intercept is taken to be the neutral case 
of “not informed non-consent.” By no means is this the only possible 
arrangement – different patterns are possible. What is attempted here is 
merely to show in what way such a model would successfully represent 
all kinds of consent; arguably then, one could construct a similar figure 
containing tens or even hundreds of cases of consent placed wherever 
on the coordinate system it seems fit.
12  Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics; Eyal, “Informed Consent.”
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Figure 1. The two-dimensional model of consent
Many assumptions have been made in order to come up with this visual 
representation of consent. The most significant one is the exact order of the 
various cases of figure 1. I shall attempt to explain the rationale followed here. 
“Full(y) informed consent” is the resultant vector of maximized intentionality 
(IN) and directionality (DI). On the other extreme, when IN and DI are 
minimum, the result is “hypothetical consent” – the case of consent where 
we merely hypothesize that the individual would consent were he capable of 
reacting at all (e.g. unconscious patients). “Consent” is thought of as a more 
general category where IN is high, but DI is low, indicating a more passive 
mood. “Full [but, apparently, not informed] consent” is related to an excess 
drive for what is offered (thus, high DI), but without much informational 
backup. Now, in order to explain why “disinformed consent” (i.e. deliberately 
false information) is related to a low level of IN, we should assume that 
information is related to IN, at least under some interpretation, where 
knowledge is connected to both information availability and consciousness 
(ergo intention). Finally, “implied consent” is the most non-directed form of 
consent: the patient who indifferently and pathetically accepts an injection 
from a nurse – given that he is otherwise capable of reacting. Compare this 
with the case of a child that is offered a bar of chocolate. Ηow positively 
would they react in the question “do you want some candies?” by giving their 
full, but alas, not informed (“uneducated”) consent?
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Some other, less important, assumptions include the numbering of the 
axes, that is, there are no negative values as we progress to lower and lower 
values of intentionality and directionality. Point (0,0) is not the same as in 
analytic geometry; it is merely a reference point for the relations between 
different cases of consent. Additionally, the distance from the centre does 
not indicate intensity – however, in other models it might serve this function 
as well.
As one observes this figure, it becomes increasingly tempting to compare 
it to the Aristotelian square of opposition. Would that make any sense? Would 
it increase our understanding of the inter-relations among different types of 
consent? I am going to support this idea in what comes next.
Firstly, in figure 2(I), the original square of opposition is presented. In 
order to fit our model, presented in figure 1, the order of the four different 
cases of the square of opposition is transformed, salva veritate, to that of 
figure 2(II).
Figure 2. (I) shows the classic square of logical opposition, while (II) is the 
transformation (salva veritate) used here to fit our model presented in figure 
1. Explanation of letters: A: Universal Affirmative; E: Universal Negative; I: 
Particular Affirmative; O: Particular Negative
Finally, based on figure 2(II), we create our square of opposition, as 
presented in figure 3; it is only just of many possible ones. What remains for 
us to see is whether our terms do right by the original square of opposition. 
Let us examine, first of all, contradicting pairs, i.e. “Consent” vs. “Disinformed 
Consent,” and “Full(y) Informed Consent” vs. “Hypothetical Consent.” 
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Indeed, it is almost trivial to ascertain that these pairs are incompatible: the 
existence of either prohibits the existence of the other one being (also) its 
denial. Contrarieties, i.e. “Consent” vs. “Hypothetical Consent” and “Full(y) 
informed Consent” vs. “Disinformed Consent” are opposite pairs as well. The 
question in contrariety is whether these two cases can be false simultaneously. 
Indeed, they can; consent, for example, may be neither full(y) informed, 
nor disinformed. It also seems that the two remaining pairs, i.e. “Consent” 
and “Full(y) Informed Consent,” as well as “Hypothetical Consent” and 
“Disinformed Consent,” all behave as sub-alternates – especially in the former 
case. A proposition is a subaltern of another if and only if it must be true if its 
superaltern is true, and the superaltern must be false if the subaltern is false.13
Figure 3. Square of logical opposition applied in consent – see also figure 2 (II)
All in all, we have demonstrated that a viable interpretation of the 
traditional square of opposition in the case of consent is possible. The reader 
should, however, keep track of the fact that what Aristotle had in mind 
when developing and laying out his logic (as expressed in his four writings 
nowadays known as Organon) was geometry and most of his examples 
were alluding there. Examples from mathematics claim the extra property 
of infinite accuracy in abstracto. Here, given the real-life concreteness of 
reference, levels of systemic accuracy are inevitably lost; it may not always 
13 Terence Parsons, “The Traditional Square of Opposition,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2019.
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be absolutely clear, for example, when and which cases are contrarieties 
and not pure contradictions, and vice versa. However, the general idea is 
well implemented in our examination of consent. We hope that we have 
contributed another important tool in our toolbox for examining consent.
III. Consent in practice
Indeed. All these cases of consent, that we have attempted to categorize, 
to modelize, and to (re)present in a universal manner, have and should have 
actual implications for actual situations. Now, it is quite usual to examine 
consent within the framework of Medical Ethics. Here, I shall attempt to 
amplify the notion of consent in two other irrelevant fields: special-needs 
education, and sociology of science. I shall deal with specific instances, in 
order to demonstrate the wider applicability of this “multi-polar” approach. 
By successfully applying any model in many cases / situations / disciplines, 
it is possible to enhance its generalizability, as well as to demonstrate its 
anti-fragility, i.e. its capacity to adapt despite perturbations.14 Here, the 
common denominator between these two examples is, of course, the 
consenting individual. In the first case, i.e. special needs education, full(y) 
informed consent is impossible. I shall try to identify what kind of consent 
is possible, to begin with, and what this kind of consent means. In the case 
of science, I shall argue that the public will not be able to provide full(y) 
informed consent (e.g. about how research money from their taxes is spent), 
if only, because the myth is constantly revived: science is about knowledge, 
and not about authority and power. I shall try to identify the implications 
of such a situation.
The scope of special needs education is wide. Based on my personal 
experience as a special needs educator for the past four years, I would say that 
it includes, e.g., both children that seem (and are) within the normal range of 
IQ or other measures and children that are not capable of performing even 
the simplest tasks for their own survival – let alone have communicational 
skills etc.15 Here, I shall focus on the characteristic population of autistic 
individuals with concomitant intellectual developmental disorder, in 
particular, with level 2 and level 3 severity levels for autism spectrum 
14 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (New York: Random 
House, 2012).
15  See also Victoria E. A. Brunsdon, et al., “Exploring the Cognitive Features in Children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Their Co-Twins, and Typically Developing Children within a 
Population-Based Sample,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 56, no. 8 (2014): 893-
902.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 22:16:29 |
[ 91 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1 • 2019
disorder.16 In such cases: “Severe deficits in verbal and nonverbal social 
communication skills cause severe impairments in functioning, very limited 
initiation of social interactions, and minimal response to social overtures 
from others.”17
Classic approaches to the problem of consent of such individuals, 
such as proxy consent or implied consent, rely on the premises of the right 
to an open future, substituted judgment, and the best interest standard.18 
However, as Graber concludes,19 such premises may not sufficiently justify 
external interventions aiming at replacing the individual’s consent, when, as 
we have seen, the individual is not capable of providing consent in the first 
place. Have we ended up with a vicious circle?
Elsewhere, I have posed the question whether talent, or equally, autism 
(with or without concomitant intellectual developmental disorder), are 
external agents.20 It is important not to identify the individual with the 
diagnosed condition. These external agents, however, distort the ability 
of the individual to consent. This leaves us with two options. We may 
choose to decide directly, based on the positive notions of protection 
and participation, or indirectly, via the various apophatic terms related to 
unintentional consent, which is not consent, as we have already argued. We 
might even consider combining these two approaches.
Deciding in terms of protecting the individual from possible harm, or 
in terms of increasing their participation in various activities, one must 
not violate the person’s consenting sphere due to the absence of past or 
future ability for intentionality. Granted, the person still has one of the two 
constituents of consent, i.e. directionality: the individual still wants things. 
But as is shown in figure 1, this only leaves room for misinformed consent, 
unintentional consent and all other types of consent (or non-consent) that 
apply – cases where intentionality is below average, i.e. below the reference 
point which would correspond to point (0,0), and directionality is above 
average, i.e. above the said threshold. By doing this, we have at least limited 
our options to a more localized area within our model. This area is shown in 
figure 4 (grey area). That is where we should look for relevant terms before 
we make our decisions.
16  American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 
Dsm-5 (Washington: American Psychiatric Publications, 2013).
17 Ibid.
18  Abraham Graber, “Autism, Intellectual Disability, and a Challenge to Our Understanding of 
Proxy Consent,” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2017): 229-236.
19 Ibid.
20  Konstantinos G. Papageorgiou, “Talent as an Unintentional Agent,” ΒΙΟ-ΗΘΙΚΑ 1, no. 2 
(2015): 38-54.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 22:16:29 |
[ 92 ]
KONSTANTINOS PAPAGEORGIOU THE ANALYTIC MODEL OF CONSENT AND THE SQUARE OF OPPOSITION
Figure 4. Types of consent expected from special needs individuals (autistic, 
with or without concomitant intellectual developmental disorder)
In the broader field of philosophy and (techno-) sociology of science there 
exists the dual discipline of STS – Studies in Technology and Science / Science 
Technology and Society.21 Within the general public, what is taken for granted 
(i.e. science is about knowledge) is put by STS under scrutiny. Is science really 
about knowledge? If not, about what else? If yes, is the meaning of what we call 
“knowledge” (or even “research”) fixed and unaltered? Many classical readings 
show that the answer to these questions is not positive, but may even be 
negative.22 Latour and Woolgar, in specific, demonstrated already from the 80’s 
how deceitful it may be to acknowledge scientific research as driven by hard facts, 
when personal empathies, ambitions and hearsay, all have a major impact to the 
final output of scientific research. Our own research has also indicated that there 
exists a chaotic difference between systems of knowledge that are still believed 
to be identical, such as science, Wissenschaft, epistēmē (επιστήμη) etc.23
21 See, for example, Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007).
22  H. M. Collins, and Robert Evans, “The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise 
and Experience,” Social Studies of Science 32, no. 2 (2002): 235-296; Bruno Latour, and 
Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1986).
23  Papageorgiou and Lekkas, “Επιστήμη Και (vs) Scientia.”
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But the general public trusts “science” (assuming it is a single entity), 
and consents to financing it with astronomical amounts of money; they 
eagerly send their children to study “science,” and they expect positive 
outcomes from “science.” Society eagerly provides plenty of resources to 
science – let alone that there are groups arguing that we should support 
scientific research even more generously. One could discriminate between 
two subsets of people who eagerly support science: individuals who are 
misinformed (or disinformed) about the true colours of science, and the 
majority of people who prefer not to get too far in the specifics of science, 
but, nevertheless, maintain a vague positive idea about the usefulness of 
science, ergo a kind of general duty to support it. So, I shall have to argue 
here that at least in the biggest part, people just provide their undriven 
– therefore, low in the direction scale –, deliberate – therefore high in 
the intentionality scale – consent to their involvement in the holy task of 
supporting science via e.g. taxation, or by paying tuition fees to universities. 
This is represented in figure 5 as the grey area in the second quartile. The 
grey area would include types of consent, such as: “not informed consent,” 
“not unintentional consent,” and “voluntary uninformed consent.”
Figure 5. Types of consent expected from the general public in relation to 
science
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Based on the outcomes of the previous section, further on I will attempt 
to examine “consent training,” based on this elaborate model of consent, as 
well as of the problems it addresses.
IV. Principle of Specificity
Here, I shall focus on the educational aspect of consent and its basic tenets. 
We have already presented a host of tools that may be used to foster the 
understanding of consent. In part, then, the educational aspect of consent has 
already been covered. However, here I am going to focus on the specificity 
of consent: we cannot expect people to understand consent without special 
training, simply because they have become more educated in general. What 
do I mean by that?
In regard to the generalizability of “mental functions,” Thorndike and 
Woodworth already since 1901 in a classic paper refuted the idea, popular 
back then, that students may readily generalize their competence from 
one subject to others and, for instance, learn Latin to become “generally 
more intelligent” (unfortunately, a still-enduring idea). As Thorndike and 
Woodworth concluded, “The functions of judging nearly equal magnitudes 
are, sometimes at least, largely separate and independent. A high degree of 
ability in one sometimes coexists with a low degree of ability in the others.”24 
The research about specificity continued during the decades that followed 
Thorndike and Woodworth’s research, most notably with Franklin Henry, who 
extended the findings to motor skills.25 Feltovich et al. argue that “there 
is little transfer from high-level proficiency in one domain to proficiency in 
other domains – even when the domains seem, intuitively, very similar.”26 This 
phenomenon is observed not only in the sciences,27 but in sports as well, or 
even in variations of the same game, or in the same game and with the same 
rules, but played by different numbers of people, or in different environments, 
or at different periods of time.
We should adopt a Principle of Specificity: being just “better” educated 
is not going to result in a greater capacity for informed consent – contrary 
24  L. E. Thorndike, and S. R. Woodworth, “The Influence of Improvement in One Mental Function 
upon the Efficiency of Other Functions,” Psychological Review 8, no.3  (1901): 247-261, 260.
25 Steven Bain, and Carl McGown, “Motor Learning Principles and the Superiority of Whole 
Training in Volleyball,” Coaching Volleyball 28, no. 1 (2011): 3-4.
26  Paul J. Feltovich, Michael J. Prietula, and K. Anders Ericsson, “Studies of Expertise from 
Psychological Perspectives,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, 
ed. K.A. Ericsson et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 47.
27 Such as medicine, where the same physicians showed great variety in assessment skills 
depending on specific experience with different kinds of cases; Feltovich et al., 47.
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to what many tend to believe. Specific and orientated training is needed from 
the early beginning of the educational process. Consent should be taught in a 
very specific manner, both theoretically and practically, starting from models 
such as the one presented here, and proceeding through analysing case-studies 
and discussing philosophical experiments. Becoming good at mathematics, at 
history, or, even, at philosophy in general, does not guarantee that individuals 
will be able to make sound choices as far as consent is concerned, in an era 
that puts ever-increasing demands on our everyday life: it is quite common 
nowadays to have to accept “Terms & Conditions” on a daily basis – or even 
many times during a single day – when in the past people had to go through 
such a process very few times in months, or even years. I would also add that 
individuals should also learn how to answer the following crucial questions 
each time:
1. What exactly do I want? (directionality).
2. How much do I need it? (intentionality).
3. What exactly is being offered to me? (sufficient information).
4. How relevant is what I want to what is being offered?
5. What are the consequences of my consent?
V. Conclusion
The epistemological approach of consent not only does shed light on the 
concept of consent itself, but it also paves the ground towards becoming 
more consent-conscious citizens. The model presented here is a first step 
towards interpreting its theoretical premises in even more ways, and applying 
it in other practical situations as well.
We need to ask ourselves what we really need consent for, if we are 
merely deterministic beings. After this brief discussion, the answer would 
seem to be that, on one hand, there are plenty of variations to choose from 
and, on the other hand, that philosophical thinking may come up with plenty 
of ideas that are not realizable; they are archetypes. The existence of these 
ideal situations is another means of realization for us. The same applies to 
mathematics: while there are no perfect shapes in reality, their conceptual 
archetypes help us understand better whatever exists in our world, and 
provide us with theoretical objects serving as models, algorithms and trends 
of description and analysis – even if this only means that they provide just a 
better way of categorizing things.
I would expect that we ought to examine and expand our understanding 
of consent through a different paradigm, in parallel with the current one. 
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It is not an entirely new paradigm though; it is merely the application of 
epistemological principles to philosophical questions. It resembles analytic 
philosophy, but also differs from it, as it relies on broader aspects of classical 
epistemology, way beyond what has come to be known as philosophical logic.
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